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WHO BEARS THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES?
Margaret M. deGuzman*
Among the many fascinating aspects of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL)’s legal legacy analyzed in Professor Jalloh’s excellent book,
one of the most intriguing is the question of who bears the greatest
responsibility for international crimes. The SCSL’s statute describes the
Court’s “competence” as extending to “persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and
Sierra Leonean law” committed in that country’s decade-long civil war.1 As
Professor Jalloh explains, the primary impetus for including this limitation
was the desire of the Court’s creators to control costs.2 This aspect of the
SCSL’s legacy may be particularly important because virtually all
international courts and tribunals face similar resource constraints. As such,
most such institutions have declared the intent to focus their efforts on
persons most responsible for the worst crimes within their jurisdictions,
regardless of whether such a limit appears in their statutes.3 The question of
who bears the greatest responsibility for international crimes goes to the heart
of the global justice project. In selecting defendants to prosecute,
international courts co-constitute, along with the various actors who create
and sustain international courts, the identity of the international criminal
justice regime. For that reason, this essay argues that future courts should
take great care in determining who bears the greatest responsibility for
international crimes.
Professor Jalloh’s book provides an excellent starting place for
exploring the impact of the SCSL’s legacy on future determinations of who
bears the greatest responsibility for international crimes. First, it analyzes the
SCSL’s holdings regarding that Court’s “greatest responsibility” statutory
provision, with trial chambers diverging as to whether it was intended as a
limit on jurisdiction or a guide to prosecutorial discretion, and the Appeals
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1 Agreement Between the United Nations and Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
2 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 62
(2020).
3 Id. at 135.
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Chamber ultimately holding the latter. Professor Jalloh argues convincingly
that the Appeals Chamber misinterpreted its statute in an effort—conscious
or not—to reach the result it considered most practicable.4 Among other
things, the judges seem to have feared that resources would be wasted if, after
a long and expensive trial resulting in conviction, the accused was found not
to be one of those most responsible.5 Professor Jalloh counters first by
questioning the assumptions inherent in this reasoning, including that a
determination could not be made earlier.6 More importantly, he deploys the
cannons of statutory interpretation, including those in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, to demonstrate that the statute’s requirement of
greatest responsibility was a limit on the Court’s personal jurisdiction, not
simply a guide to the prosecutor’s discretion.7 For instance, the limitation’s
placement in a provision entitled “competence” signaled an intent to create a
binding requirement.
Perhaps more important for the Court’s legacy than this question of
statutory interpretation is the matter of how the SCSL interpreted the term
“greatest responsibility.” After a thorough discussion of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this regard, Professor Jalloh concludes that the Court
adopted the correct interpretation. That is, the Court extended the reach of
“persons bearing greatest responsibility” not only to persons in positions of
leadership or authority in organizations that committed international crimes,
but also to perpetrators of the more “wicked” crimes.8
Professor Jalloh’s excellent analysis of the work of the SCSL with
regards to the “greatest responsibility” provision, raises at least two important
issues for the work of future courts and tribunals: first, whether such
provisions should be included in international court statutes, and second,
assuming such limits are adopted, either by statute or through prosecutorial
policy, how should “greatest responsibility” be interpreted? In the remainder
of this essay, I offer some thoughts about each of these questions, answering
the first in the negative, and suggesting that the latter should take account of
institutional goals and values.
First, assuming Professor Jalloh is right that the SCSL’s greatest
responsibility provision was a jurisdictional limit on the Court’s reach, those
establishing future courts should avoid such limits. International crimes are
often committed by persons acting within organizations, such as military
groups, and it is generally appropriate for international courts to focus on the
4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 137–46.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 140–42.
Id. at 112.

4 - DEGUZMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Who Bears the Greatest Responsibility?

7/11/2021 12:10 PM

23

leaders of such groups in allocating responsibility and imposing punishment.
For instance, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was right to
focus on the Nazi leadership, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia appropriately adjudicated the crimes of those most responsible
within the Khmer Rouge leadership. Beyond the top leaders of criminal
organizations, however, it is very difficult to determine who bears greatest
responsibility for crimes. What does it mean for crimes to be particularly
“wicked,” “heinous,” or otherwise “grave”? As I have written elsewhere,
these are complex concepts that do not lend themselves easily to consistent
interpretation and application.9 Yet inconsistent application can undermine a
Court’s legitimacy.
The situation in Sierra Leone illustrates this point. Unlike the Nazis and
Khmer Rouge, there was no single organization that bore greatest
responsibility for the crimes committed in the conflict in Sierra Leone.
Instead, there were several organizations that committed crimes of various
kinds and to various degrees. The SCSL’s first prosecutor adopted a strategy
of prosecuting a small number of leaders from each of the three principal
organizations. In his view, this approach best illustrated the kinds of crimes
committed and expressed condemnation of those crimes to the broadest
audiences, particularly to victims.10 This approach was controversial. In
particular, it raised the question whether, by spreading prosecutions among
the three organizations, the prosecutor inappropriately telegraphed a moral
equivalency among them. In fact, two of the groups had committed many
more serious crimes than had the third. Another approach consistent with the
goal of prosecuting “persons bearing greatest responsibility” would have
been to select the organization responsible for the most widespread crimes
and prosecute a greater number of leaders from that organization.
A similar controversy arose at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), which has similar language in its constitutive
document.11 The ECCC’s co-prosecutors agreed on the top ten defendants,
but when the international co-prosecutor sought to expand the number of
defendants, the Cambodian prosecutor demurred, asserting that additional

9 See MARGARET M. DEGUZMAN, SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY: GRAVITY AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2020).
10 David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience, 15
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 3 (2008) (describing the indictments of RUF, CDF, and AFRC leaders).
11 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006, art. 1 [hereinafter “Law on
ECCC”].
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defendants were beyond the Court’s mandate.12 This decision was broadly
attacked as political given that the Cambodian government opposed
including the new defendants for fear it would be implicated in their cases.13
The difficulty of identifying the scope of “those who were most
responsible”14 inhibited effective argument on both sides of this debate.
In light of such difficulties of interpretation and application, therefore,
those creating courts and tribunals should avoid including jurisdictional
requirements limiting personal jurisdiction based on degree of responsibility.
As a policy matter, on the other hand, it is entirely appropriate, indeed
important in many cases, for international courts and tribunals to focus their
efforts on those they believe bear particular responsibility for the most
serious crimes in the situation. In fact, this is standard practice in many
national prosecutor’s offices. If a prosecutor is unable to prosecute all those
responsible due to resources or other constraints, she will typically seek to
adjudicate the cases of those highest up the ladder, often by obtaining the
cooperation of those below them.
Given that most international courts and tribunals will seek to prosecute
those they deem most responsible for the international crimes in their
jurisdictions, it is important for such institutions to develop procedures for
identifying such individuals. Such procedures will largely be a matter of
prosecutorial policy, although in some courts, including the ICC,
prosecutorial selection decisions are subject to review in some circumstances.
Additionally, the bodies that govern international courts, like the ICC’s
Assembly of States Parties, should play a part in developing the procedures
for identifying the most responsible defendants.
In determining who bears greatest responsibility, such actors should
endeavor to align their decision-making with articulated institutional goals
and priorities. This is the best way to ensure the effectiveness of international
criminal law’s institutions. Effectiveness requires the identification and
application of goals and priorities, against which the institution’s actions can
be measured.15 In some situations, the answer to the question who bears
greatest responsibility may be intuitively obvious. A president who directed
the apparatus of the state to commit genocide surely is one of those most
12 Cambodia: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - New International CoProsecutor Should Commit to Fulfilling the Tribunal’s Mandate, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 4, 2009),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/44000/asa230222009en.pdf.
13 See, e.g., Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Convictions ‘Too Little, Too Late’, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/08/cambodia-khmer-rouge-convictions-too-littletoo-late.
14 Law on ECCC, supra note 11.
15 Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 230 (2012).
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responsible for the ensuing crimes. Often, however, a more nuanced
understanding of what an institution seeks to achieve is necessary to make
the greatest responsibility determination. The ICC, for instance, could set as
an institutional goal to address the needs for justice of a certain victim
population. This goal would likely counsel adjudicating a rather broader set
of perpetrators in the situation than the Court would if its goal were to express
global condemnation of a select set of crimes.
The process of formulating goals and priorities and using them in
determining who bears greatest responsibility should be a dynamic one.
Prosecutors should be careful not to adopt inflexible policies in this regard
since institutional goals and priorities change over time. Moreover,
international courts and tribunals should seek to engage a wide spectrum of
their constituencies in this process. Whether explicitly in policy statements,
or implicitly in their selection decisions, international courts and tribunals
express their goals and priorities to such audiences, who then react. The
institutions should take account of such reactions as they continue the
process. In this way, the institutions and their supporters co-create norms
about who bears the greatest responsibility, and thus contribute to the gradual
development of international criminal law.

